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THE SELF-ACTUALIZING FUNCTION OF LAW 
IN THE SOVIET CONTEXT 
JAMF.S L. HILDEBRAND* 
Whoso would undertake to give institutions to a People must 
work with full consciousness that he has set himself to change, 
as it were, the very stuff of human nature; to transform each 
individual who, in isolation, is a complete but solitary whole, 
into a part of something greater than himself, from which, in a 
sense, he derives his life and his being; to substitute a 
communal and moral existence for the purely physical and 
independent life with which we are all of us endowed by 
nature. 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Traditionally, law and legal systems have been viewed as performing 
three major roles or functions in society: (1) the institutional role, which 
includes allocation of authority or power and provides for ascertaining 
rules of accepted interhuman behavior and the delimiting of sociolegal 
relationships; (2) the conflict resolution role, which provides for the 
orderly application of the legal rules; and (3) the interpretational role, 
which includes the provision for sociolegal change and the redefining of 
social relationships. But our analysis need not stop here since 
sociological and behavioralistic studies of and approaches to legal 
analysis may provide even greater insights into the synergistic or 
interactional aspects of law within a functioning and ongoing legal 
system, including such phenomena as the reciprocal nature of social 
control within a legal system, the relatively positive attributes of some 
forms of social deviance, the social function of reason, and the means 
for and the effects of progressive sociolegal change.2 As Professor 
Robert Merton has stated: 
Sociology need not make men wise or even prudent. But, 
through its successive uncovering of latent social problems, 
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1. Rousseau, The Social Contract, in SocIAL CONTRACT: ESSAYS BY LOCKE, HUME AND 
RoussEAU 205 (G. Hopkins transl. 1962). 
2. The major problem in the area of legal sociology continues to be the lack of a 
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sociological inquiry does make men increasingly accountable 
for the outcome of their collective and institutionalized 
actions.3 
For the most part the theories of sociological jurisprudence to date 
have treated law as a passive rather than an active agent in social 
change. From this perspective, law is viewed merely as responding to 
new circumstances and social pressures; it is not seen in its heuristic, 
educational, and opinion-creating roles. Obviously, this same feeling 
pervades the other schools of jurisprudential thought to an even greater 
degree. But such a view is becoming increasingly less tenable, especially 
in recent years, as the great social effects of legal change within the 
legal systems throughout the world have become too obvious to be 
ignored. The question is no longer whether law is a significant vehicle of 
social change; rather the questions are how it so functwns, what the 
special problems are that arise, and how society can plan for optimal 
systemic legal change. In a sense, laws and legal change constitute an 
important social reality. 4 
Today there is a need for a new synthesis springing from an 
interdisciplinary analysis of the sociology of law and for a new typology 
of the basic functions of a legal system. It may be useful, therefore, in 
understanding the sociological obligations inherent in a legal system, to 
expand the traditional view of the role and functions of law to include 
those functions of social change and social conformity which are made 
evident by viewing law and the legal system from a new sociological and 
human interactional perspective. 
As a starting point for this new typology of legal functions we might 
posit an operational (and in large part Weberian) definition of 
law-namely, law is a set of ought ideas which are held in the minds of 
compehensive integration of jurisprudence and social research. One commentator has 
noted : 
Unless jurisprudential issues of the nature and functions of law, the relations of 
law and morals, the foundations of legality and fairness, and the role of social 
knowledge in law are addressed by modern investigators, the sociology of law 
can have only a peripheral intellectual importance. 
Selznick, The Sociology of Law, in 9 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
50, 58 (D. Sills ed. 1968) . 
3. Merton, Social Problems and Sociological Theory, in CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL PROBLEMS 
697, 710 <R . Merton & R. Nisbet eds. 1961). Similarly, the problems which are brought 
before the legal profession involve "questions of economics, politics, and social policy 
which legal training cannot solve unless law includes all social knowledge." M. COHEN, 
REASON AND LAW 83-84 (1950). 
4. "Reality, then, in this distinctively human world, is not a hard immutable thing bu t 
is fragile and adjudicated-a thing to be debated, compromised, and legislated." G. 
McCALL & J. SIMMONS, lnENTITIES AND INTERACTIONS 42 (1966). 
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a specific group of people, the effectiveness of which is increased by the 
existence of an enforcement staff of specialists. In terms of social 
system function, legal order can be defined as that sub-system within 
any total social system characterized by a high degree of sub-system 
differentiation, which has as its primary function the maintenance of 
total system integration or equilibration. However, it should be stressed 
that what I am suggesting is not a static equilibrium theory, but rather 
social system equilibrium in an historical and evolutionary context. 
Law must integrate the past with the present while making provision 
for the future. 
For the purposes of this discussion, the sociological functions of law 
and the legal system can be grouped under the following nine headings: 
(1) coercive role, which can be divided into the proscriptive function of 
law-that is, law as a statement of what not to do-and the prescriptive 
function-that is, law as a statement of how to act "rationally" within 
the constructs of accepted communal behavior; (2) distributive 
function-that is, law as a means for defining and delimiting sociolegal 
relationships; (3) integrative function-that is, law as a means for 
conflict resolution and the settlement of interpersonal and intergroup 
disputes; ( 4) psychological function-that is, law as a means for 
creating and maintaining the psychological and behavioral mentality or 
frame of reference necessary for the continuance of the particular 
sociolegal system; (5) legitimizing function-that is, law as a means for 
"legalizing" both the existing sociolegal system and planned future 
systemic change; (6) homeostatic function-that is, law as a means for 
pattern maintenance and for equilibrating dysfunctional fluctuations 
caused by systemic change; (7) educational and "parental" 
function-that is, law as a means for channelling and rechannelling 
societal interests and values as well as a means for guiding social 
behavior; (8) heuristic function-that is, law as a force for creating and 
stimulating opinion; and (9) self-actualizing function-that is, law as 
a means for the positive creation of a statement of rules for orderly 
sociolegal change and as a means for goal attainment within the context 
of planned or programmed change. 
As shown in Figure 1 below, these nine sociolegal functions can be 
divided into groups of three under the general headings of present-
perspective, past-retentive, and future-directive, or, similarly, 
pragmatic, static, and dynamic. It is submitted that, when relatively 
balanced, these three groupings of the social functions of law can and do 
maintain the social system equilibrium in an historical and 
evolutionary context, as discussed above. 
3
Hildebrand: The Self-Actualizing Function of Law in the Soviet Context
Published by SURFACE, 1972
4 SYRACUSE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. I:l 
FIGURE 1 
Tentative Typology for an Interactional Theory of Law 
A. Present-Perspective 
(Pragmatic Aspect) 
1. Coercive Role 
a. Proscriptive Function 
b. Prescriptive Function 
2. Distributive Function 
3. Integrative Function 
B. Past-Retentive C. Future-Directive 
(Dynamic Aspect) (Static Aspect) 
1. Psychological Function 
2. Legitimizing Function 
3. Homeostatic Function 
1. Educational and 
"Parental" Function 
2. Heuristic Function 
3. Self-Actualizing 
Function 
Obviously, within an ongoing sociolegal system these nine functions 
overlap one another as well as interact within the general typology 
presented here. Although these nine sociolegal functions are inherent in 
almost any legal system, it should be apparent that the form and 
content of the particular governing political structure may have the 
effect, directly or indirectly, purposely or inadvertently, of placing 
greater emphasis on some of these functions while limiting or 
deemphasizing others. Furthermore, it should be remembered that the 
sociolegal system as a whole is greater, in the Gestalt sense, than the 
sum of its component parts. 
In another article, I have discussed at length the "parental" and 
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heuristic functions of law in the Soviet Union.5 However, before 
discussing the self-actualizing function of law in the Soviet context, it 
may be useful to make a few brief statements concerning the "parental" 
and heuristic functions, not only for an understanding of the Soviet 
legal syste~, but also for an increased awareness of the role and 
functions of law within any dynamic social system. 
The heuristic function of law is that aspect of a legal system by which 
individual or collective opm10ns concerning social and legal 
relationships are created or stimulated through the interaction that 
takes place between the law and social behavior. It might also be called 
the "propagandistic" function-in the positive as well as negative sense 
of the word. The ideology and avowed political philosophy of a social 
system, as well as its practiced variations, can affect to a large measure 
the heuristic function of law within that system.6 The extent to which 
the heuristic function is emphasized in a sociolegal system depends 
upon the effect of ideological, cultural, and traditional constructs upon 
the "content" of the law within the general societal framework. 
In comparison, the notion of the educational and "parental" function 
of law focuses on the role of law as a guiding teacher and parent. The 
"parental" aspect of Soviet law and the Soviet legal system has been 
described by Professor Harold J. Berman as follows: 
Implicit in the Soviet legal system is a new conception of the 
role of law in society and of the nature of the person who is the 
subject of law. The Soviet legislator, administrator, or judge 
plays the part of a parent or guardian or teacher; the 
5. Hildebrand, The Sociowgy of Sovie t Law: The Heunstic and "Parental " Functions. 
22 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 157-229-(197-1). 
6. For an excellent discussion of the ideological differences of perspective that juristic 
political scientists bring to bear upon their teaching, research, and writing, see Schubert. 
Academic Ideowgy and the Study of Adjudication, 61 AM. PoL. Sc1. REV. 106 (1967). See 
also Mendelson, The Neo-Behavioral Approach to the Judicial Process: A Cntique, 57 AM. 
PoL. Sc1. REV. 595 (1963); Miller, On the Interdependence of Law and the Behavioral 
Sciences, 43 TEXAS L. REv. 1094 (1965). 
With respect to the self-actualizing function, political ideology can also have a 
conservative effect on the systemic behavior of the sociolegal system; for example, the 
idealized tenets of a pluralistic democr~cy may create dilemmas in effectuating "legal" 
foreign policies as well as ideologically compatible domestic policies. See J . HILDEBRAND, 
SOVIET INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN EXEMPLAR FOR OPTIMAL DECISION THEORY ANALYSIS chs. iv & 
viii (1969); C. LINDBLOOM, THE INTELLIGENCE OF DEMOCRACY (1965); Q. WRIGHT, PROBLEMS OF 
STABILITY AND PROGRESS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 275 n.6 (1954). For an analysis of the 
tendency of "legalistic thought" to assume, promote, and enforce an ideology of consensus 
and agreed-upon rules, see J. SHKLAR, LEGALISM (1964). See also Carlin & Howard, Legal 
Representation and Class Justice, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 381 (1965); Ericksen & Ericksen, 
Ideological Aspects of the Legal Profession, 9 J. LEGAL ED. 290 (1957); Grossman, Social 
Backgrounds and Judicial Decision-Makinfl_, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1551 (1966); Swett, Cultural 
Bias in the American Legal System, 4 LAW & Soc'y REV. 79 (1969). 
5
Hildebrand: The Self-Actualizing Function of Law in the Soviet Context
Published by SURFACE, 1972
6 SYRACUSE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 1:1 
individual before the law, 'legal man,' is treated as a child or 
youth to be guided and trained and made to behave. I have 
called this the 'parental' aspect of Soviet law, though it should 
be understood at the outset that the concept of parentalism 
does not necessarily imply benevolence. 7 
Professor Berman's analysis of the "parental" nature of Soviet law 
provides an excellent-and to date unsurpassed-sociological 
description of that particular sociolegal function. The "parental" or 
educational function of law is generally conceived in the various 
analyses of the Soviet legal system, as well as in related analyses of 
most other legal systems, in terms of its unidirectional and institutional 
aspect-that is, the state being a parent or guiding teacher to the 
citizen: 
To speak of 'parental law' is ... not so much to describe the 
state which proclaims and applies the law as to describe the 
assumptions which are made regarding the nature of the 
citizen and his relationship to the state. To say that under 
Soviet law the state has extended the range of its interests and 
its powers is not enough. The state has sought in law a means 
of training people to fulfill the responsibilities now imposed on 
them-and it has made this function of law central to the 
whole legal system.8 
However, the concept of the "parental" and educational function of 
law need not be limited to the unidirectional and institutional concept of 
"parental law." As shown in Figure 2 below, the "parental" or 
educational function can be viewed as either unidirectional, as it is 
generally conceived in the Soviet Union and in most other legal systems, 
or as interactional within the general societal system. It is submitted 
that the interactional perspective more closely approximates reality in 
almost any given legal system-the child is often father (or parent) to 
the man (or the state). 
7. H. BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R.: AN INTERPRETATION OF SOVIET LAW 6 (rev. ed. 
1963). See generally id. at 277-384. The "parental" aspect of Soviet law has also been dis-
cussed under the heading of "paternalism." See Campbell, The Legal Scene: Procedur-
alists and Paternalists, SURVEY: A JOURNAL OF SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES, No. 
57, Oct. 1965, at 56-66. 
8. H. BERMAN, supra note 7. at 284. 
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FIGURE 2 
The Unidirectwnal and Interactional Perspectives 
Parental Function 
(unidirectional) Parental Function (interaction al) 
7 
LAW t> BEHAVIOR LAW~ BEHAVIOR 
Parental Function 
(in teractional) 
When modeled on a time-scale, the interactional perspective of the 
sociolegal system assumes an ever-increasing synthesis and integration 
as shown in Figure 3 below. This effect is representative of sociolegal 
systemic change, or what Alfred Korzybski has referred to as man's 
time-binding capacity. 9 
FIGURE 3 
Paradigm for Time-Scale Representation 
of the Interactional Perspective 
Law
1 /eha~ ~w 2 • .,_Behavior 2 ~/~ 
Lawn Behavior n 
9. See A. KORZYBSKI, MANHOOD OF HUMANITY 91-92 (1921). 
Admittedly, the time-scale representation in Figure 3 lacks the general systems th eon: 
concept of goal-changing feedback, which Professor Karl W. Deutsch has defined as 
including "feedback readjustments .. . of those internal arrangements which implied [the 
system's] .. . original goal, so that the net will change its goal, or set itself new goals 
which it will now have to reach if its internal disequilibrium is to be lessened." Deutsch, 
Some Notes on Research on the Role of Models in the Natural and Social Sciences, 7 
SYNTHESE 506, 515 (1948-1949) . See also J. HILDEBRAND, supra note 6, at 102-103, 121-28: 
Maruyama, The Second Cybernetics: Deviation-Amplifying Mutual Causal Proces.-; es, 51 
AM. SCIENTIST 164 (1963). Figure 3 could be modified to represent a. simple systems 
analysis, however, by drawing feedback loops from Law nl to Law 2. Law 1, and Behavior 1 
and from Behavior n to Behavior 2, Behavior 1 and Law 1 as follows: ' 
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This increasing synthesis and integration, which is also the social 
function of reason, should not be limited in its goal to the technocratic 
slogan of "prediction and control," but ought to include reasoned moral 
choice which, in the area of sociolegal change, further accentuates the 
interactional perspective. The Soviet legal system, like most Western 
legal systems, does not expressly recognize this social function of 
reason, but rather stresses (in the unidirectional sense) the role of 
"socialist law" in implementing preestablished ideological constructs. 
The Soviet legal system can be characterized not only by the unique 
emphasis placed on the "parental" and heuristic functions of law, but 
also by the emphasis placed on the self-actualizing function of 
law-that is, the role of law as a means for the positive creation of a 
statement of rules for orderly sociolegal change and as a means for goal 
attainment within the context of planned or programmed systemic 
change. The ideology and political philosophy of Soviet-Marxism are 
based on a relative concept of the perfectibility of man, and in part it is 
through the operation of the interim or transitional legal system of 
socialist law that the goal of true communism and public self-
government is hoped to be attained in the Soviet Union. Socialist law is 
conceived as having an important role to play in implementing pre-
established ideological constructs within the Soviet Union. 
The self-actualizing function of law in the Soviet context will be 
discussed in this article under the general headings of (1) the 
perfectibility of man, (2) the ideology of law, (3) the resulting 
habituation, and ( 4) dysfunctionality. 
II. THE PERFECTIBILITY OF MAN 
The perfectibility of man is an optimistic idea which is pervasive in 
the writings of Hegel and Marx. While this idea is common to other 
social theorists, Hegel's and Marx's respective versions of it are among 
the most elaborate and the most suggestive. As Professor John 
Plamenatz has stated: 
It is the idea of perfectibility which receives at their hands 
dimensions unknown in the eighteenth century because Hegel 
penetrates more deeply into the human mind and Marx into 
the social processes affecting that mind. Though their versions 
of this idea may be open to criticism on other grounds, they are 
hardly touched by most of the criticisms levelled at the 
Hegelian and Marxian social philosophies. It would be a pity if 
this idea, so largely and rightly associate<J with them, were lost 
in the general condemnation of their systems. It is an idea 
which deserves to be extracted from those systems and to be 
considered on its own merits. 10 
10. J. PLAMENATZ, MAN AND SOCIETY: POLITICAL AND SOCIAL THEORY, BENTHAM THROUGH 
MARX 403 (1963). 
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Stated briefly, the concept of the perfectibility of man views man in 
the historical and inevitable process of coming to understand himself as 
a self-conscious creature aware of himself and his fellow humans as 
living in a relatively coherent society which can be rationally explained 
and thus coming to acquire in progressive stages a set of values which 
are more adequate to his nature and condition than any set of values 
previously developed. This ideal is not just another elucidation of the 
old Stoic and Christian idea of an eternally valid moral law, a higher 
law of reason, a supposedly self-evident law which anyone capable of 
understanding and defining human nature can see applies to any 
human being in his dealings with other such beings. In contrast 
(although not necessarily mutually exclusive), the perfectability of man 
is based on the humanistic belief that man can rationally determine not 
only the validity of his present and past value systems but can also 
direct his future sociocultural development. Even if we hold with the 
position of Hume and many other contemporary philosophers that 
moral rules differ from factual statements as well as from 
mathematical and logical propositions, and even if we agree that an 
"ought" cannot be derived logically from an "is," we need not 
categorically reject the perfectibility concept of Hegel and Marx. 11 
Regardless of what we may personally believe to be the correct 
explanation of moral rules and value judgments, we need not be 
precluded from agreeing with Marx and Hegel that men gradually 
acquire rules and values adequate to their present nature and social 
condition, a process which is not only accretive over many generations 
but may also modify its end-goal objectives. (Our increased 
consciousness is altered not only by quantitative leaps in information 
and understanding but also by the actual processes of our reaching each 
new level of consciousness.) To paraphrase Professor Plamenatz, rules 
and values are at least minimally adequate to numan nature and the 
human condition whenever men are so placed, psychologically and 
socially, that their desires and ambitions are in keeping with one 
another and with the rules and values they mutually or reciprocally 
accept, and when the functional means are not lacking to realize these 
values and rules. 12 
Rousseau firmly believed in the "natural rights" of the individual. He 
saw man's usual condition in society to be such that there arise passions 
incompatible with one another and with the rules and values man is 
taught to accept. Therefore, man only half accepts these rules and value 
judgments, he is by no means free of their influence, and yet he cannot 
live by them in practice because of his natural passions. For Rousseau 
11. See id. at 403-04. 
12. Id. at 404. 
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the fundamental political problem was "to find a form of association 
which will defend and protect with the whole common force the person 
and goods of each associate, and in which each, while uniting himself 
with all, may still obey himself above, and remain free as before." 13 In 
order to attain this goal, each individual must by a social contract 
sacrifice all his natural rights to the community as a whole. However, 
this does not necessarily mean a resulting loss in liberty: "Each man, in 
giving himself to all, gives himself to nobody; and as there is no 
associate over whom he does not acquire the same right as he yields 
others over himself, he gains an equivalent for everything he loses, and 
increase of force for the preservation of what he has." 14 Not only the 
passions, but also the values are social products; they are human 
products and result from man's social condition. According to 
Rousseau, man's passions and values are such that he cannot live a 
satisfying life, a life in which his passions and his values are in 
harmony and he has the means to get what he most strongly desires. 
Rousseau condemned nearly all human societies because they make it 
impossible for man to live a satisfying life, or, as he put it, "a life 
according to nature." 15 
Rousseau imagined an ideal society which would be free of the defects 
of actual society. He did not believe, however, that the development of 
this ideal society was inevitable or that knowledge was the panacea for 
all man's social ills. It is in this regard that Hegel and Marx differ most 
substantially from Rousseau. Both Hegel and Marx imagined a long 
process of social, intellectual and moral evolution which would lead 
man steadily and inevitably to that level of · consciousness where he 
would comprehensively understand himself and the world, and where 
his passions would be in harmony with his values and his ambitions 
could be realized with the means at his disposal. Man would no longer 
be alienated from his society, but rather he would be "whole" and secure 
in the social world which would be both the product and the sphere of 
his activities. 16 
If we denv-and most critics of Marxism do denv it-that 
there is any such steady and inevitable process, we are not 
bound in logic also to deny that there is a set of rules and 
values, a moral system, which all men would accept if they 
understood the nature and social condition of man, a system in 
keeping with the passions and ambitions which would be 
strongest in them if they and other men had that 
understanding. We may admit this possibility, even though we 
13. RoussEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, bk. I, ch . vi(G. Cole transl. 1913). 
14. Id . 
15. See J. PLAMENATZ, supra note 10, at 404-05. 
16. Id. at 405. 
10
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 1, No. 1 [1972], Art. 2
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol1/iss1/2
1972] THE SELF-ACTUALIZING FUNCTION OF LAW 
are at pains to insist, against the Stoics and against Rousseau, 
that there is no eternally valid moral law in the sense of a set 
of moral rules which can be derived logically from a true 
description of human nature or of the divine purpose for man. 
We can also hold, quite consistently, both that there is a moral 
code which men, having reached the condition, social and 
intellectual, enabling them to conceive of it, can see is the most 
fully adequate to their nature and condition, and that all other 
moral codes, though each is received while social conditions are 
propitious to it, are inadequate in the sense that men, in those 
conditions, acquire passions and ambitions difficult or 
impossible to satisfy and not in keeping with the moral code 
they accept. In other words, we can, without logical 
inconsistency, accept both the moral relativism of Marx and 
his belief that there is a morality more adequate than the 
others because it is what men are moved to accept when they 
have come to understand themselves and the world, when they 
have taken their own measure and have cheerfully assented to 
it: a morality they are unlikely to abandon because the 
understanding which brings it in ·its train also educates their 
passions and ambitions to conform with it. 17 
11 
There may have been <indeed there may still be) primitive 
communities where men's passions and values were so much in 
harmony that what Marxists cai'l alienation did not exist. In such 
communities, if they have ever existed, the moral and sociocultural 
values were again "adequate" to human nature and man's social 
condition. Hegel and Marx both assumed that most men would be 
rational and moral if placed in the right social environment, and that 
the causes of alienation were mostly social and would eventually 
disappear. 
Recognizing the obvious alienation which exists in all civilized 
countries today, at least four simplistic theories of social change and 
cultural development might be posited. First, optimistically and despite 
intermittent regressive periods, man is manifestly destined to progress 
to ever higher levels of understanding and social adequacy wherein his 
moral and cultural values will attain greater equilibrium with his 
nature and social condition. Second, man has already attained his 
highest level of sociocultural progress, and therefore he should attempt 
to maintain (or reclaim) in the future those respective levels of 
perfection which have been achieved in the past. Third, man is passing 
ceaselessly through a cycle of change and disequilibrium. Fourth, 
regardless of whether man has actually attained any true heights of 
sociocultural perfection, he is destined by his inherent nature to reach 
increasingly lower levels of sociocultural decay. 
In the following two paragraphs Professor Plamenatz has succinctly 
17. Id. 
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summarized Rousseau's, Hegel's and Marx's respective approaches to 
social change and cultural development: 
Rousseau and Hegel both suggest that men, when their 
passions and values are not in keeping with one another, are 
profoundly unhappy; they are, as the common phrase has it, 
'untrue to themselves,' or, as Rousseau put it, 'outside 
themselves,' or as Hegel says, alienated. They are in a painful 
condition possible only to rational creatures, and only reason 
can find a remedy for it. As Hegel sees it, men, when they 
reflect on this condition, strongly desire to change it; they 
strive, at first confusedly but more deliberately and hopefully 
as their understandin~ grows, to set themselves and society in 
order. They make their way slowly to a condition where their 
passions and values are-in harmony with one another, where 
their ambitions are within their powers, where self-respect is 
possible, where life, though strenuous, seems worth all tl~e 
effort it calls for, where men need look for nothing outside 
themselves arid the societies they have created to console them 
for being alive. Rousseau describes the evil but suggests no 
practicable remedy for it; Hegel has more to say than 
Rousseau about its social and historical causes and makes bold 
to predict an inevitable remedy. Rousseau's pessimism is 
excessive, being as much an effect of temperament as 
supported by cogent argument, and Hegel's optimism is not 
better grounded. But it is, or may be, more useful; it is 
encouraging and perhaps also, to some extent, a guide to 
action. Though we do not believe that what Hegel predicts 
must come true, we may, insofar as we find it good, sharing his 
idea of freedom, strive to make it come true. 
Marx, like Hegel, is an optimist, but in at least one respect, 
he is more plausible than Hegel. He foretells great social and 
political changes before what he thinks desirable can come to 
be, before there can be a morality adequate to man's nature 
and his social condition. Man is still alienated; he is still so 
situated, socially and culturally, that he is impelled to strive 
for what does not satisfy him, that he lives, not as he would 
live if he knew how, but as the market requires. He may not 
accept wholeheartedly the values of bourgeois society but, 
unless he is consciously a revolutionary, he does not reject 
them either; and if he is revolutionary, he cannot live by the 
values he accepts, for society will not let him. Man in bourgeois 
society, as Marx depicts him, is still short of the knowledge and 
self-knowledge [true consciousness] needed to out an end to 
alienatwn; he has still to make great changes in society and to 
be himself greatly changed before his condition is such that 
what he strives for is within his reach and seems to him fully 
worth while, before he sees himself and his situation as they 
really are and wants what he can get and what will satisfy 
him. Though Marx says too little about the society of equals to 
make it clear just how he conceives of the freedom which is (so 
he thinks) the condition of men's living truly satis~ying lives, 
12
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he does not find his ideal, as Hegel does, fully realized in the 
nation-state of his own century. He is, in this, both truer to the 
ideal which he shares with Hegel and more realistic. For their 
ideal is also, at bottom, the ideal of Rousseau and Kant: that no 
man should be the mere instrument of other men, and that all 
men should be able to live in accordance with principles they 
inwardly accept. They differ from Rousseau in being 
altogether free from parochialism and obscurantism, and from 
Kant in the interest they take in the cultural and social 
conditions of freedom. Marx is truer ... to this ideal than 
Hegel, not in giving a clearer account of it, not in speaking 
more profoundly about freedom and equality and how they 
stand to one another, but in refusing to admit that it could be 
achieved in the kind of social and political order which 
satisfied Hegel. There existed in Hegel's time and in Marx's, as 
there still exists today, a widespread desire for greater 
freedom and greater equality, a wide-spread striving after an 
ideal which was deeply attractive though not clearly defined; 
and there was also a strong belief that freedom could not be 
much enlarged unless there were greater equality. Though 
Hegel spoke more eloquently and even perceptively of freedom 
than ever Marx did, it is not too much to claim that Marx held 
the more firmly of the two to the common ideal. 18 
13 
It would be absurd to argue that the Hegelian and Marxian concept of 
the perfectibility of man is beyond criticism. But regardless of whether 
we reject their accounts of social evolution, or accept it, or be strongly 
attracted to it, we must also conclude, as rational beings, that the ideal, 
though perhaps never to be realized completely, is indeed worth striving 
for. 
III. THE IDEOLOGY OF LA w 
For the purpose of this discussion , an ideology can be defined 
essentially as an action-related system of ideas. An effective ideology 
must contain a program and a strategy for its realization, and a major 
purpose of an ideology is to unite organizations which are built around 
it.19 
18. Id. at 406-07. 
19. See Friedrich & Brzezinski, Totalitarian, Ideology, in POLITICAL THEORY AND IDEOL-
OGY 123 (J. Shklar ed. 1966). For a discussi0n of the motivational role of Soviet Ideol-
ogy, see Fleron & Kelly, Personality, Behavior and Communist Ideology, 21 SOVIET 
STUDIES 297 (1970). See also Bell, Ten Theories in Search of Reality: The Prediction of 
Soviet Behavior, 10 WORLD POLITICS 327 (1958); Chambre, Soviet Ideology, 18 SOVIET 
STUDIES 14 (1967); Daniels, The Ideological Vector, 18 SovIET STUDIES 71 (1966); Joravsky, 
Soviet Ideology, 18 SovIET STUDIES 2 (1966); Meyer, The Functions of Ideology in the 
Soviet Political System: A Specu/,ative Essay Designed to Provoke Di,scussion, 17 
SoVIET STUDIES 273 (1966); Redaway, Aspects of Ideological Belief in the Soviet 
Union: Comments on Professor Meyer's Essay, 17 SOVIET STUDIES 473 (1966); Wesson, 
Soviet Ideology: The Necessity of Marxism, 21 SovIET STUDIES 64 (1969); Wesson, The 
Soviet State, Ideology and Patterns of Autocracy, 20 SovIET STUDIES 179 (1968) . 
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The Soviet jurists and social theorists currently stress two aspects 
concerning the relationship between the Marxist concept of law and 
ideology. The first is that ideology exercises an influence on law. Since 
law is created by men, it stands to reason, state the Soviet-Marxists, 
that law is necessarily "an expression of definite ideological moti\tes, or 
in other words, the rules of law are laid down by the state authorities in 
accordance with the ideology of the classes wielding the power." 20 The 
second aspect is that law also exercises an important influence on social 
and individual consciousness: 
Just as socioeconomic, political and other factors must pass 
through the consciousness of the law-maker, and take the form 
of ideological motives to find expression in law, so legal rules 
do not influence social relations automatically, but by 
exercising an influence on the consciousness and behaviour of 
men. In this context, law plays an important ideological, or as 
it is sometimes called, educational role in society. By making 
definite ideas, principles and rules of behaviour mandatory for 
all, encouraging their observance and holding out the prospect 
of punishment in the event of non-observance, the law 
promotes the elaboration of definite views, principles, motives 
of behaviour, etc. 21 
The treatment of the problems of social structure and social change 
by Soviet jurists and social theorists remains immaculately doctrinal, 
despite some current efforts by Soviet sociologists to bring into the 
doctrinal framework a certain awareness of actual social realities. For 
those Marxists who operate on an intellectual level of gross 
oversimplification, law is a class phenomenon and it is indissolubly 
bound up with the state; law and coercive legal institutions will wither 
away in the future classless and stateless communist society. The state 
of true communism will be accompanied by a great material abundance 
and society will be ruled by the principle "from each according to his 
abilities, to each according to his needs," thus making superfluous the 
substantial premise of law on the need to exercise control over the 
measure of consumption.22 "In virtue of its social wealth and very high 
level of consciousness of its citizens there will be no need either for the 
authorities to impose any special bans or sanctions. Human relations 
will no longer require such legal regulation as protection of one person 
20. THE SOVIET STATE AND LAW 196-97 (V. Chkhikvadze ed. 1969). Professor V. M. 
Chkhikvadze is head of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences' Institute of State and Law. 
21. Id. at 197. 
22. Assuming first the "great material abundance" and second an effective distribution 
system so as to make operationally possible the tenet "from each according to his abilities, 
to each according to his needs,'· there still remains the inescapable problem of how to 
determine what constitutes an individual need. Clearly what someone may "want" ma:v 
not be what he "needs." Furthermore, should some persons be entitled to greater needs? A 
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against another through the courts and measures of state com-
pulsion." 23 
The Soviet social theorists are quick to point out, however, that the 
withering away of law does not mean that there will be no rules of 
appropriate behavior in communist society at all. "No society is possible 
without definite rules of community life, and a highly organized society 
is inconceivable without distinct and generally accepted social rules." 24 
The Soviet-Marxists further argue that it is incorrect to assume that the 
theory of the withering away of the state and law implies either a 
negative attitude or a Marxist hostility for law. "The Marxist 
proposition about the withering away of law under communism," state 
the Soviet jurists and social theorists, "is merely a statement about its 
future, and should not be taken as an assessment of its past or present 
role." 25 
Of course, the Soviet-Marxists continue to maintain that the state 
and law will wither away in time-that is, will be dissolved in public 
self-government and in the rules of communist community living. 
However, they also now state that this process "will take a rather long 
historical period, during which study of the urgent problems of the 
state and law constitutes one of the chief requirements of scientific 
management of the very process of withering away of the political-legal 
superstructure." 26 Nevertheless, they maintain that "there is every 
reason to assume that the theory of socialist law, the theory of the 
socialist state, will develop in the future into the theory of public self-
government, into the science of the rules of human behavior, into a 
very frank statement recognizing this problem was made by S. G. Strumilin at the 
conference of the Economics Institute in June 1950: 
Before speaking about distribution according to needs, the needs being 
referred to must be clearlv defined. The needs of the members of the communist 
society are the needs of educated, cultured people who do not abuse their 
opportunities of obtaining consumers' goods. A science of consumption is already 
being created now. An Institute of Nutrition, which studies rational norms of 
nourishment, exists in the U.S.S.R. People's requirements under communism 
will be extremely diverse and individual, but on an average there must be a 
gravitation toward fixed norms which would completely satisfy the needs of 
socially developed people. Reports and Dic;cussions: On the Mean.-; for the 
Gradual Transition from Socialism to Communism, Voprosy ekonomiki, No. 10. 
1950, at 99, translated in 3 CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SovIET PREss, No. 2, Feb. 24, 
1951, at 7. 
See also Sherman, The Economics of Pure Communism, 21 SovIET STUDIES 24 (1970): 
Wiles. A Comment But Not a Rejoinder, 21 SovIET STUDIES 37 (1970). 
23. THE SovIET STATE AND LAW, supra note 20, at 198-99. 
24. Id. at 199. 
25. Id. at 200. 
26. Ideology, Science, Life: The Science of Law in the Conditions of Communist 
Construction, Kommunist, No. 16, 1963, at 26. translated in 15 CURRENT DIGEST OF THE 
SovIET PRESS, No. 49, Jan . 1, 1964, at 19, 23. 
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most important part of the complex of sciences of guiding the 
development of the communist socioeconomic formation." 27 
Is there any likelihood of breaches of social rules under communism? 
The Soviet jurists and social theorists currently answer this question as 
follows: 
Of one thing we may be sure: not on the old scale. However, 
even such a highly organized society as communism cannot be 
immune from possible departures from the generally accepted 
rules of community life, which may result from pathological 
emotions; there may be breaches of official duty or accidental 
clashes between men, etc. But the point is not whether these 
are possible or not, but whether, because of the highly 
conscious and active attitude of the people around, they will be 
immediately cut short without the participation of any special 
state bodies. Lenin spoke of the need to suppress various 
excesses under communism as well, and emphasised that this 
would not require any special machinery of suppression, 
because the people would do it themselves 'as simply and 
readily as any crowd of civilized people, even in modern 
society, interferes to put a stop to a scuffle or to prevent a 
woman from being assaulted.' These swift social reactions will 
spring from a sense of collectivism, and the assurance that any 
person engaged in suppressing an excess will immediately find 
public support. A deeply ingrained sense of collectivism, as 
man's second nature, is a condition for the withering away of 
the law. 28 
From the perspective that it is the social being of men-that is, their 
practical activity and its social conditions that are the basis on which 
their consciousness develops-the Soviet social theorists view law as 
having an important ideological task to perform. This ideological role of 
law tends generally to increase, especially in epochs of great social 
change. "Legal acts give explicit expression to principles and ideas 
behind the new social system, thereby becoming mandatory for all." 29 
Thus law becomes an important self-actualizing means for social 
transformation and systemic change, demonstrating new models of 
social relations: 
Law determines the behavior of men and regulates their 
most important relations, thereby exercising a substantial 
influence on the course of social development as a whole. Once 
it has arisen, it acquires a relative independence in respect of 
the socioeconomic system, and may either go along with social 
(including economic) development or run against it ... . 
At any rate, law is never passive in respect of the 
27. Id. 
28. THE SOVIET STATE AND L AW, supra note 20, a t 199 (footnotE omitted). 
29. Id. at 197. 
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socioeconomic system and always operates as an important 
factor in consolidating the social relations which have taken 
shape, in some cases actively promoting the establishment of 
new relations, whenever the necessary material conditions are 
there. Law also exercises a palpable influence on the economy, 
and the more complex the economic mechanism of a society 
organised as a state, the stronger is the influence it exerts in 
many concrete directions.30 
17 
While the role of socialist law in effecting social transformation and 
systemic change is admittedly great, the Soviets frequently complain 
that Wes tern commentators often distort the Marxist thesis concerning 
the ideological role of law: 
Because the rules of law are specific in that their execution 
may be ensured through state coercion, some authors draw the 
conclusion that Marxism regards the educational role of law as 
boiling down to the influence exercised on men's consciousness 
and mentality by methods of coercion and repression. 
Naturally, this portrayal of the educational role of law turns 
out to be incompatible with the rights and freedoms of citizens, 
so that criminal law becomes the main instrument of 
education. 31 
According to the Soviet social theorists, as the Soviet Union evolves 
into a true communist society a "new Soviet man" will concurrently be 
fashioned. Of course, this objective must be considered in light of the 
tremendous social changes which are now taking place throughout the 
world, both in communist and non-communist countries. The general 
collapse of traditional social frameworks and ways of life in face of the 
techno-cultural revolution may be bringing about the emergence of a 
new mass breed of man all over the face of the earth. But the unique 
feature of the "new Soviet man" is that his sociocultural development is 
to be planned and guided.32 
Although the presence of a conscious and centrally planned strategy 
for social change has historic parallels in Russia's own history under 
Peter the Great, as well as in Meiji Japan, and in Ataturk's Turkey, in 
the Soviet case 
we have the distinctive combination of planned social change 
instituted from above, centrally directed and executed by a 
body whose occupational role is that of effecting change, 
backed by the power and all the economic and political force 
which a totalitarian regime can muster, guided by a central 
30. Id. at 190-91. 
31. Id. at 197-98. 
32. The 1961 U.S.S.R. Communist Party Program set forth in detail the blueprint for 
the creation of the "new Soviet man." See The New Program of the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union, in ESSENTIAL WORKS OF MARXISM 371-486 (A. Mendell ed. 1961). 
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theory or ideology, carried out at a relatively unprecedented 
rate, and extending into every dimension of social life. 33 
In 1960 an authoritative Soviet work entitled The Foundatwns of 
Communist Educatwn, compiled jointly by the Academy of Social 
Sciences attached to the Party Central Committee and the R.S.F.S.R. 
Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, stated in a chapter entitled 
"Construction of Communism and the Education of the New Man": 
One of the most important aspects of the radical 
reorganization of society during the transition from capitalism 
to socialism, and subsequently its further development from 
socialism to communism, is the education of the new man. This 
is an inseparable, organic part of the struggle for socialism and 
communism, without which the victory of the new order is 
altogether impossible. Socialism and communism cannot be 
consolidated without a fundamental change in the 
consciousness of people, their views, mores and habits. 34 
The goal of creating the "new Soviet man" is based on the Marxian 
concept of the perfectibility of man, as discussed above. The Soviet 
social theorists see a vital connection between the material and 
technical base and the emergence of the "new man." Since people's vices 
are conditioned by the nature of the social order, it has been argued by 
many utopian social theorists that a new society must be created before 
maximum human potential can be realized. However, before you can 
create a new society you must create a new people. Scientific socialism 
found a way out of this apparent dilemma by claiming that both human 
beings and their social conditions can be changed simultaneously. Man 
transforms his social environment, which at the same time transforms 
him. Thus, the creation of the new Soviet man, "the splendid man of the 
communist future," is an absolute necessity for the Soviet social 
theorists. Without the "new Soviet man" there can be no "material and 
technical base," without the "material and technical base" there can be 
no "new man," and without one or the other there can be no true 
communist state. 
What, then, is the new Soviet man to be like? Continued Party 
pronouncements and statements by leading Soviet social theorists 
indicate that the "new man" will have the following six main 
distinguishing features: (1) a wholly scientific approach to the world; (2) 
a new attitude towards labor; (3) a new communist morality; ( 4) 
proletarian internationalism combined with socialist patriotism; (5) no 
mental survivals of bourgeois capitalism (which includes a new attitude 
33. A. INKELES, SOCIAL CHANGE IN SOVIET RUSSIA 4 (1968). 
34. 0SNOVY KOMMUNISTICHESKOGO VOSPITANIYA (THE FOUNDATIONS OF COMMUNIST 
EDUCATION] 5 (Moscow ed. 1960), translcted in Pismenny, The "New Man," 4 STUDIES ON THE 
SovIET UNION, No. 1, 1964, at 49. 
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towards property); and (6) immunity to the influence of bourgeois 
Western ideology. All of these characteristics can be related to the 
cardinal communist virtue of a boundless zest for work, with additional 
emphasis on the time-honored virtues of honesty and diligence. Thus, 
acquisition of a wholly scientific approach to the world does not signify 
only an accumulation of knowledge, but "occurs ... above all in the 
process of socially productive and political activity." 35 Communist 
morality means not only "utter devotion to the cause of communism" 
but "is expressed in concrete deeds: in honest labor for the good of the 
people, in the preservation and multiplication of social wealth." 36 
Socialist patriotism means not only to serve one's motherland but also 
"to be a frontline fighter everywhere and in everything-in the factory, 
in the fields, in the ranks of our glorious armed forces ... in science and 
technology." 37 Even proletarian internationalism is rooted in labor, in 
the production of economic and cultural wealth and values to serve as 
models for the socialist nations. 
To quote the 1960 Soviet treatise on The Foundations of Communist 
Education again: "The most important thing in a communist education 
is the development of a communist attitude towards labor. Among the 
multifarious qualities of a man in a communist society, first place must 
be assigned to the ability to work for society ... and concern for raising 
labor productivity." 38 Under communism, labor is to be transformed 
into a voluntarily accepted obligation to society. 
In comparison, the 1970 antiparasite and "refusal to work" law 
promulgated in the Russian Republic reflects a more coercive approach 
to the Soviet masses' voluntary obligation to work according to its 
capabilities.39 Under this law a person accused of living a "parasitic way 
of life" shall be given a warning by the police stating that he should find 
suitable work. If the individual does not find such work within 15 days, 
the local government is compelled to assign him a job in the general 
region where he lives. If he then "maliciously refuses" to work, he is 
liable to criminal charges and could face up to a year's deprivation of 
freedom or corrective tasks for the same period. 
35. Kommunist, No. 5, 1964, at 53, translated in Pismenny, supra note 34, at 50. 
36. Id. at 59, translated at 51. See also Glezerman, Society, the Collective and the 
Individual, Pravda, Oct. 31, 1966, at 3, translated in 18 CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET 
PRESS, No. 44, Nov. 23, 1966, at 15; Chkhikvadze, The Individual and the State: Mu-
tual Responsibility, Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo, No. 1, 1971, at 19, translated in 23 
CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SovIET PRESS, No. 9, Mar. 30, 1971, at 1. 
37. N. KHRUSHCHEV, 0 KOMMUNISTICHESKOM VOSPITANII (ON COMMUNIST UPBRINGING] 174 
(Moscow ed. 1962). translated in Pismenny, supra note 34, at 51. 
38. OsNOVY KOMMUNISTICHESKOGO VOSPITANIYA, supra note 34, at 24, translated at 51. 
39. !<'or a discussion of the antiparasite and refusal to work laws, see Hildebrand, supra 
note 5, at 206-13. 
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Recent concrete sociological studies of work attitudes and individual 
goals provide an interesting commentary on the present status of the 
Soviet people's attitudes toward work. Some of the most striking 
findings are those concerning the attitudes of Soviet youth. Even 
though Soviet-educated, molded by the Komsomol (Young Communist 
League), and socialized within the Soviet totalitarian system, these 
young people still think and behave differently from what the leaders of 
the system would optimally like. Rural youth characteristically leave 
their villages and emigrate to the large cities at the same time the Party 
needs workers in the rural areas to fill labor shortages. Very few 
Soviet youths want to work at the new construction sites in the 
rural areas where they are most needed. From the data presented 
in Table 1 below, which has been compiled from local surveys 
made between 1963 to 1967,40 it appears that the highest percentage of 
those who are prepared to go to work is to be found in the Estonian 
Republic, an area which was not part of the Soviet Union until World 
War II. The lowest percentage is in nearby Leningrad city and province, 
an area which has been subject to long-time and strenuous Soviet 
educational efforts. To paraphrase Professor Zev Katz: in the land of 
"workers and peasants," very few of the youth want to be workers, and 
much less peasants; the great majority want to go to college and to be 
members of the "intelligentsia." 41 
Of course, some of these phenomena, such as the high aspiration to 
college, are a result of Soviet education and sBciocultural development. 
The Soviet young people are more educated, more demanding, more 
achievement-oriented in accordance with the Soviet-inculcated value 
system. But this analysis may circumvent the more obvious 
explanation. 
Although the term "alienation" is not usually applied to the Soviet 
worker, what is found by some sociological surveys in the Soviet Union 
often amounts to very much the same thing. Almost all survey research 
about Soviet youth shows a high incidence of labor turnover, of 
dissatisfaction with work, transgression of labor discipline, deviant 
40. See Z. Katz, Soviet Sociology-A Half-Way House, Oct. 1970, at 35 <Russian 
Research Center, Harvard Univ.), citing V. Vodzinskaia. Vybor professii kak sotsial' 
'pos' naia problema, 1968, at 7-8 (disserta.tion at Leningrad Univ.); Ya. Tkach, in ZHIZNEN-
NYE PLANY MOLODEZHI 89-93 (Sverdlovsk ed. 1966); Shubkin, Youth Enters Life, Voprosy 
filosophii, No. 5, 1965, at 62; M. Titma, in MoLODEZH I TRUD 72 (V. Yadov & V. Dobrynina 
eds. 1970); Aitov, Obrazovanie rabochykh i ikh trud, Voprosy filosophii, No. 11, 1966. at 23. 
41. Z. Katz, supra note 40, at ~4 . .Professor Katz's interesting and suggestive work has 
been published in slightly different form in PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM, May-June 1971. 
For a discussion of the various social "classes" in the Soviet Union, see Labedz, Soci-
owgy and Social Change, SURVEY: A JOURNAL OF SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES, No. 
60, July 1966, at 18. 
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behavior, and so on. Polls about political socialization show that the 
Soviet youth are a serious problem. Despite the relatively high impact 
of ideological motivation, for many young Soviet workers labor has not 
become the personal need it was suppose to be.42 This is also indicated 
by surveys about aspirations and motivations of the young people in the 
Soviet Union. Whereas in early polls the usual aspirations of young 
people were set in terms of "helping in building communism," "serving 
the fatherland," "gaining approval of the collective," etc.,43 the result& 
of recent studies look quite different. For example, Table 2 below sets 
forth the results of a survey made in Leningrad in 1966.44 It would 
appear that volunteering for work at a new construction site was the 
least attractive to the respondents, whereas "visiting other countries," 
"achieving material well-being" and "buying a car" were among the 
main primary and secondary aspirations. However, as Professor Katz 
has pointed out, "it is impossible to know how much of the manifest 
change in aspirations is real and how much of it is due to the changes in 
phrasing the questions and to the atmosphere of legitimization of such 
answers in the U .S.S.R." 45 
42. A. ZDRAVOMYSLOV, V. YADOV, CHELOVEK I CGO RABOTA fMAN AND His 
WoRK] 292-96 (Moscow ed. 1969), English translation published by the International 
Art~ and Sciences Press (!ASP). White Plains. New York. See also Yadov. Man and 
His Work: Satisfied and Di,ssatisfied, Izvestia, Mar. 3, 1970, translated in 22 CURRENT 
DIGEST OF THE SoVIET PRESS, Mar. 31, 197Q; . Zdravomyslov & Yadov, Soviet Worker's 
Attitude Toward Work: An Empirical Study, in SOVIET Soc10wav: HISTORICAL ANTECE-
DENTS AND CURRENT APPRAISALS 347 (A. Simirenko ed. 1966). 
43. But cf J. Glagolev, Methodology of Prognostication of Peace and Disarmament 
Problems, paper presented at the VII World Congress of Sociology, Varna, 1970. See also 
Katz, The VII World Congress of Sociol,ogy at Varna: An Encounter Between Two 
Sociological Cultures, THE AMERICAN Soc10LOGIST, May 1971, at 177. 
44. See Z. Katz, supra note 40, at 38, citing S. IKONNIKOVA & V. L1sovsKY, MoLODEZH o 
SEBE, o SVEIKH AVERSTNIKAKH (Leningrad ed. 1969). 
45. Z. Katz, supra note 40, at 39. 
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TABLE 1 
Life Plans of High School Graduates 
Want to 
study: 
Leningrad (city and 88.0% 
province) 
Sverdiovsk (city and 84.6% 
one district) 
Novosibirsk (province) 80.0% 
Kazan (city) 71.5% 
Ufa (city) 65.3% 









Want to Don't know, Total 
work: no answer: respondents : 
3.0% 9.0% 1872 











In an effort to overcome bourgeois tendencies and to inculcate a new 
social discipline in the masses, the Soviet social theorists have 
continued to emphasize the ideological role of certain judicial and quasi-
judicial institutions. "Particular attention should be paid to the legal 
education of [Soviet] young people and to inculcating in them a 
consciousness of their high responsibility to society and to the state and 
of a deep respect for all standards and rules of the socialist 
community." 46 
46. The Citizen and the Law, Izvestia. Sept. 22, 1970, at 1, translated in 22 CURRENT 
DIGEST OF THE SovIET PRESS, No. 38, Oct. 20, 1970, at 14. 
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TABLE 2 
Leningrad Survey (1966 ): 
"What are your aspirations for the near future?" 











(1) To get an interesting 
and well-liked job 
(2) To get a higher education 
(3) To visit other countries 
(4) To achieve material well 
being 
(5) To achieve good housing 
conditions 
(6) To raise (professional) 
qualifications 
(7) To find true friends 
(8) To raise children to be 
exemplary human beings 
(9) To meet one's love 
(10) To marry 
(11) To buy a car 
( 12) To get a secondary 
education 
(13) To go to a new 
construction site 

























































However, the self-actualizing function of law in the Soviet context is 
not to effect the desired social transformation merely by overt coercion: 
Undoubtedly, the prospect of juridical sanctions being applied 
does exercise an educational influence on the less conscious 
members of society for whom the observance of generally 
accepted rules of behaviour is yet to become hamtual. But that 
does not at all explain the ideological role of law. When, for 
instance, Soviet doctrine speaks of the educational role of the 
socialist law, it implies a broad range of questions constituting 
the content of the law in force: the principles and rules of 
behaviour it teaches men; the fact that, being fixed in law, 
progressive ideas and views acquire especial force, because 
they operate as the mandatory demands of society; that legal 
regulation must not merely bind, but mainly convince men 
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that the prescribed behaviour is right, so that the laws 
themselves must be observed consciously and voluntarily and 
not under pain of punishment. 47 
IV. THE RESULTING HABITUATION 48 
The Marxist-Soviet social theorists contemplate a process whereby 
man will become habituated to the observance of his communal social 
duties. They often speak of the "new Soviet man" becoming 
"accustomed" or "acquiring habits" appropriate to the developing 
communist state of public self-government. The socialist law and legal 
system are viewed as having key roles to play in developing the 
appropriate social consciousness: 
The role of law in the life of society is considerable and takes 
on a special form in social consciousness which is the 
consciousness of law, that is a system of views and concepts on 
law, its social purpose and key institutions. Marxist theory 
devotes great attention to the problem of consciousness of law 
but it does not in any sense reduce it to the role of the 
consciousness of law in the application of law. It is the wider 
problem of studying their comprehension of law and the 
attitude taken to it by the broadest masses of the population.49 
There is little indication that the Soviet social theorists view the 
resulting habituation as an openly interactive process wherein the 
common man can directly affect (and thereby change or abolish) the 
institutionalized forces which are establishing the appropriate behavior 
patterns. Rather, the Soviet social theorists seem to view the habitua-
tion process as unidirectional, whereby relatively "distant" forces, such 
as the professional Party leaders, induce observance of the new social 
norms through a process of accommodation utilizing certain legal and 
social organizations. There is no immediate indication that the 
subservience of the legal system to Party control will be eliminated. 
A few Soviet jurists and social theorists have at times discussed the 
educational use of the legal and legislative processes in terms which 
seem to imply direct interaction of the educators and the educated.50 
47. THE SovIET STATE AND LAW, supra note 20, at 198 (emphasis added). 
48. Portions of this section are based on D. Funk, Law as Schoolmaster: Rule of Law 
Implications and Soviet Theory, June 1968, at 30-31, 77-83 (Unpublished M.A. thes is in 
Ohio State University Library ). 
49. THE SovIET STATE AND LAW, supra note 20, at 198. "The Marxist-Leninist science of 
law ... must actively influence the consciousness of the working people and must 
propagandize and strengthen the democratic principles of life in Soviet society." 
Zhogin, Questions of Soviet Law: Abreast of the Times, Izvestia, Jan. 22, 1964, at 3: 
translated in 16 CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS, No. 3, Feb. 12, 1964, at 24,25. 
50. See, e.g. , Golunsky, The Creative Revolutionary Role of Socialist Law in the Period 
of the Comprehensive Building of Communism, Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo, No. 10, 
1961, translated in 1 SovIET LAW AND GOVERNMENT, No. 1, Summer 1962, at 13, 22. 
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Here again, however, the creative participation of the masses is 
conceived in terms of collective participation and not individual 
disturbance to the existing sociolegal system. This concept is consonant 
with the idea of socialist democracy, which calls for "the broadest 
participation of the masses in the administration of society and the 
state." 51 
The resulting habituation theme appears fairly consistently in 
Marxist-Soviet writings from Lenin to contemporary times. Lenin, for 
example, stated in State and Revolution that: 
very soon the necessity of observing the simple, fundamental 
rules of everyday social life in common will have become a 
habit. The door will then be wide open for the transition from 
the first phase of communist society to its higher phase, and 
along with it to the complete withering away of the state.52 
In this same work, Lenin further indicated that when the stage of true 
communism is ultimately reached 
there will vanish all need for force, for the subjection of one 
man to another, since people will grow accustomed to the 
observance of the elementary rules of social life that have been 
known for centuries and repeated for thousands of years in all 
school books; they will become accustomed to observing them 
without force, without compulsion, without subordination, 
without the speC'i,al apparatus for compulsion which is called 
the state.53 
And again, Lenin stated that the state will be able to wither away 
"when people have become accustomed to observe the fundamental 
rules of social life, and their labour is so productive that they [will] 
voluntarily work according to their ability." 54 For Lenin it was clear 
51. Savitsky, Democracy, Legality and the Individual, Izvestia, Feb. 20. 1969. at 2. 
translated in 21 CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SovIET PRESS, No. 8, Mar. 12, 1969, at 20. 
The tendency of the modern phase of Soviet law is to continue the polic~· of 
subordination of individual interests to the commands and the interests of 
society, and to eradicate from the psyche of the Soviet citizen the element of 
assertiveness in regard to the rights of the individual. Social reforms on which 
communist society is predicated stress coordination. discipline. and conformity. 
The message of the social order in the Soviet society addressed to the individual 
is that through collective action the welfare of the individual is to be achieved. 
The state and public authority appear in the public eye as the benefactors of all. 
K. GRYZBOWSKI, SoVIET LEGAL INSTITUTIONS: DocTRINEs AND SocIAL FUNCTIONS 
169-70 (1962). 
52. v. LENIN, STATE AND REVOLUTION 84 (lnt'l Publishers ed. 1968). 
53. Id. at 73-74. 
54. Id. at 79-80. Similarly, one year later, Lenin wrote that "in communist society 
democracy will gradually change and become a habit, and finally wither away." V. Lenin, 
The Proletarian Revolu tion and Renegade Kautsky, 3 SELECTED WORKS 87 (Moscow ed . 
1960). See also Engels, Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, in BASIC WRITINGS ON POLITICS 
AND PHILOSOPHY 68, 105-06 (L. Feuer ed. 1959). 
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that in the true communist state man must attend to his social duties 
through "habit," that is, having become "accustomed" to the 
appropriate communal behavior patterns. 
During the Stalin era, A. Y. Vvshinski addPil that in the highest 
phase of communism, "[a]ll will learn to get along without special rules 
defining the conduct of people under the threat of punishment and with 
the aid of constraint." 55 He also stated that people will be "so 
accustomed to observe the fundamental rules of community life that 
they will fulfill them without constraint of any sort." 56 It was also 
about this time that S. A. Golunskii and M. S. Strogovich wrote that in 
communist society 
[t]he rules of life in common will be observed without the 
restraint exerted by a state mechanism, solely by virtue of the 
conscious discipline of the communist social order, respect for 
each other and for their common interests, and established 
habits which have become part of a mode of living. 57 
Numerous Soviet social theorists have continued to make the point 
that observance of the norms of communist society will become 
habitual. For example, G. Shaknazarov, writing on communist society, 
has emphasized that the rules of social behavior must become a habit, 
that there must be a "habitual sense of collectivism" and that one of the 
most important tasks of communist education is to instill proper 
behavior patterns in the masses until they become second nature.58 The 
Comrades' Courts and the Peoples' Volunteer Militia are viewed as 
contributing significantly to this task. 59 A. I. Denisov has added that: 
From the time when all [the people] are administering social 
affairs on their own, the observation of the fundamental rules 
of human society will gradually come to be a universal habit, 
obviating the need for that apparatus of organized and 
systematic compulsion called the state." 60 
Similarly, Ye. Klyenov has stated that: 
The advance of Soviet society toward communism requires 
steady intensification of educational work among the people 
and the creation of conditions that will make the observance of 
55. A. VYSHINSKI, THE LAW OF THE SOVIET STATE 52 <1948) . 
56. Id. 
57. Golunskii & Strogovich, The Theory of State and Law, in SOVIET LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 
351, 399 (H. Babb. transl. 1951). 
58. Shaknazarov, From the State of Communist Selj~Government, Politicheskoe 
samoobrazovanie, No. 8, 1960, trans/,ated in 1 SOVIET REVIEW, No. 4, 1960, at 54, 60-61. 
59. See Hildebrand, supra note 5, at 198-206. 
60. Denisov, On the Relationship of State and Society in the Period of Transition from 
Capitalism to Communism, Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo, No. 4, 1960, at 29, translated 
in 12 CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS, No. 22, June 29, 1960, at 17, 19. 
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rules and regulations become a human habit, and work a vital 
human necessity. 61 
27 
In a more extended statement, N. Mirenov seems to foresee the 
replacement of state compulsion by habituation after a process of 
reeducation: 
In socialist society compulsion therefore remains an important 
means of eradicating crime. Later on, of course every citizen 
will observe the laws voluntarily, out of deep inner conviction 
and awareness of moral duty, by force of habit. But until they 
do, the state must uphold law and order by applying 
compulsion. It now becomes a matter not of rejecting 
compulsion but of gradually narrowing the sphere of its 
application, spearheading punitive measures against 
imperialist agents, confirmed criminals, dangerous recidivists 
and others who do not lend themselves to reeducation.62 
One of the pronouncements of the 1961 New Program of the 
Communist Party was that in communistic society proper social norms 
will become a habit for everyone.63 In a more recent statement, P. S. 
Romashkin has claimed that "the conscious and voluntary observance 
of the rules of socialist community-already second nature to most 
Soviet people-must become a habit with all members of society, 
making compulsion by the state superfluous," since one of the necessary 
requisites of the emergence of the conditions necessary for true 
communism is observing "the rules of the communist way of life as a 
matter of habit." 64 
Through a process of education, the disciplined, goal-oriented, 
striving, energetic, optimistic, productive "new Soviet man" will be 
habituated so that he will conform to proper social norms and values 
without state compulsion. This educational process is to be effectuated 
through the use of certain iudicial and quasi-judicial institutions (the 
regular courts, the Comrades' Courts, and the Peoples' Volunteer 
Militia), th us ultimately enabling man (it is hoped) to live in an 
organized communist society without alienation and without the 
coercive institutions of state and law. 
Most Soviet social theorists have not concerned themselves with an 
analysis of the specific type of educational process in which they 
61. Klyenov, Public Participation in Settling Labor Disputes, Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i 
pravo, No. 1, 1960. translated in 2 SovIET REVIEW, No . 11, 1961, at 34. 
62. Mironov, Persuasion and Compulsion in Combatting Antisocial Acts, Kommunist. 
No. 3, 1961, translated in 2 SovIET REVIEW, No. 9. 1961, at 54, 61. 
63. The New Program of the Communi-;t Party of the Soviet Union, supra note 32, at 
458, 466. 
64. Romashkin, The Soviet State and Law at the Contemporaru Stage, in 
FUNDAMENTALS OF SovIET LAW; 7, 14 (P. Romashkin ed. & Y. Gdobnikov transl.. no date). 
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propose to utilize certain sociolegal institutions. However, this may 
sometimes be inferred from their descriptions of the educational 
process itself. In addition, underlying the whole communist program is 
the general idea that the Communist Party, as the vanguard of the 
revolution, must be the decision-making body which will decide how 
man is to be remade in preparation for the evolving communist state. In 
general, therefore, the "new Soviet man" is merely subjected to the 
educational process, and it is not intended that he should directly 
influence society's ultimate goals by his own individual participation 
and interaction within the institutionalized sociolegal system. 
Recent Soviet literature indicates that the educational process 
utilizing certain judicial and quasi-judicial institutions can be 
categorized as authoritarian. It is common for Soviet jurists and social 
theorists in discussing the educational use of legal institutions in 
changing man to refer to a process of "instilling" or "inculcating" new 
social attitudes, new labor discipline, and so on. They also refer from 
time to time to the process of "molding," "shaping," and "refashioning" 
the new Soviet man. Comrades' Courts are viewed as playing an 
educational and indoctrinational role. 65 Similarly, the regular court's 
role as educator and "propagandist of Soviet laws" is said to be fulfilled 
if the trial is well organized and the sentence is correct. 66 Moreover, the 
courts are to continue their activity "aimed at influencing people who do 
not submit to the rules of socialist society and who resist educa-
tion." 67 These terms and the actual use of certain judicial and quasi-
judicial institutions are indicative of an authoritarian bias in the re-
sulting educational process. 
For the purposes of this discussion, authoritarian education can be 
defined as that process whereby individuals are guided in developing 
appropriate attitudinal and behavioral patterns by external influences 
which do not permit direct individual interactive participation in 
determining the communal tenets and mores to be inculcated. Professor 
Sydney Hook has described authoritarian education as follows: 
We shall ... call those tendencies in education authoritarian, 
which, by blocking the roads of inquiry, prevent freedom of 
intellectual choice; which, by discouraging critical 
participation in the processes of learning, obstruct individual 
growth; which, by imposing dogmas of doctrine or program, 
blind students to relevant alternatives and encourage 
conformity rather than diversity; which, in short, fail to 
65. See Hildebrand, supra note 5, at 200-06. 
66. See id. at 213-21. 
67. Rudenko, Intensifying the Struggle Against Especially Dangerous Crimes, Izvestia, 
May 7, 1961, at 5, translated in 13 CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS, No. 18, May 31, 
1961, at 21. 
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recognize that the supreme and ultimate authority, the final 
validating source of all other authorities in human experience 
is the self-critical authority of critical method-or 
intelligence.68 
29 
Professor Horace M. Kallen has described the authoritarian element 
as follows: 
In the history of teaching, such words as 'indoctrination,' 
'instruction,' 'inculcation' give away the persistent relation 
of teacher to pupil, of adult to child. It is a r.elation of superior 
to inferior power, of hardness to plasticity, of authority to 
dependence. The primary activities upon which the later 
meanings of the words are variations, are activities of building 
in, stamping in, talking in .... [C]ommonly the doctrines of 
the inculcators are presented as self-evident ineluctable truths. 
But it must be obvious that if they were such, indoctrination 
would be unnecessary. If indoctrination is necessary, the 
doctrines can be neither self-evident, nor ineluctable.69 
Authoritarian education can be contrasted with the pervasive ideal of 
liberal democratic education which is "to achieve a community of 
persons who, on the basis of reliable knowledge about themselves and 
the world in which they live, can develop freely in a free society." 70 
The main attributes of authoritarian education stand out clearly 
from these discussions. The relation of teacher to pupil, of parent to 
child, involves external dictation and imposition, formation by a 
superior from without by means of indoctrination, to mold the pupil to 
conform to the appropriate model which is in the mind of the guiding 
teacher. The key factor in this authoritarian educational relationship is 
that the teacher, as superior, necessarily recognizes no right in the 
individual being taught to resist the molding process. The process is 
that of unidirectional habituation, and not mere training or 
conditioning. As Professor John Dewey remarked with respect to 
authoritarian education: "[t]he philosophy is eloquent about the duty of 
the teacher in instructing pupils; it is almost silent regarding the 
privilege of learning," 71 or, we may add, of not learning. 
If man is to be remade by a process of indoctrination, we may call this 
educational use of legal institutions "authoritarian." The relationship 
68. Hook. The Danger of Authoritarian Attitudes in Educatio11. in lssuEs IN EDUCATION : 
AN ANTHOLOGY OF CONTROVERSY 117 (B. Johnson ed. 1964). 
69. H. KALLEN, THE EDUCATION OF FREE MEN: AN ESSAY TOWARD A PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCA-
TION FOR AMERICIANS 149 (1949). Cf C. LEWIS, THE ABOLITION OF MAN: OR, REFLECTIONS ON 
EDUCATION WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE TEACHING OF ENGLISH IN THE UPPER FORMS OF 
SCHOOLS 38-41 (1947). 
70. Hook. supra note 68, at 117. 
71. J. DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
EDUCATION 71 (3d ed. 1966). 
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between educator and the individual being educated here is strictly that 
of superior to inferior, of parent to child. The individual is subjected to 
the educational process and changed or educated whether he consents or 
not. 72 It is not necessarily his "true nature" that is developed by the 
educational process, nor is he necessarily permitted to affect or change 
that process in any significant way. 
Many persons consider a certain manner of operation to be a 
necessary requirement for an institution to be call€d "legal." Since 
Dicey's classic exposition,73 operation in accordance with the rule of law 
has often been considered one of these necessary requirements. Actions 
which are not taken under reasonably specific rules are considered 
administrative and therefore not legal. Discretionary administration 
proceeds in an ad hoc fashion without reference to general rules, and it 
usually appears arbitrary in comparison with the rule of law. However, 
many actions of ordinary courts are not governed by rules to any 
significant degree. For example, in the United States there are only 
very broad rules governing such matters as the equitable division of 
property of a husband and wife about to be divorced, the selection of a 
specific criminal penalty (less than the maximum) to "fit the crime," or 
the attributes of a "reasonable man" throughout the law of negligence 
and contract. Similar difficulties exist in defining "contributing to the 
delinquency of a minor," "monopoly and attempts to monopolize," and 
in the determination of what charitable scheme is "as near as possible" 
to the one that became impossible to carry out. 
Nevertheless, to advocate the use of legal institutions according to the 
rule of law doctrine is to advocate adherence to certain minimal 
standards of formalized legal procedure and standards of substantive 
legal content.74 The rule of law, therefore, provides a standard by which 
the operation of legal institutions may be judged. 
In contrast, if a social reformer is advocating the use of legal 
institutions for an authoritarian educational purpose (in an effort to 
change or inculcate certain behavior patterns), he cannot expect the 
legal institutions to operate strictly in accordance with the rule of law 
doctrine in order to carry out this educational program. Instead, the 
legal institutions must necessarily emphasize administrative action and 
correspondingly decrease the rule of law. (Of course, he may not value 
the rule of law as highly as the desired change in human nature or his 
proposed social reform, and if this is the case, then he may not be overly 
72. Of course, even if coerced it may still be his will-coatus tamen voluit. 
73. See A. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION, ch. xii 
(10th ed. 1959). 
74. Concerning the rule of law doctrine, see Symposium on the Rule (~f Law, 59 MICH. L. 
REv. 487-613 (1961). Cf H. MANNHEIM, CRIMINAL JusncE AND SocIAL R.ECONSTRUCTION, ch. x 
(1946); Pound, The Rule of Law and the Modern Welfare State, 7 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1953). 
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concerned with the dysfunctional effects of his proposals on the rule of 
law. ) 
Briefly stated, there appears to be a tendency to advocate 
administrative operation which is contrary to the rule of law when the 
authoritarian educational use of legal institutions is advocated in th e 
Soviet Union. 
There are, of course, Soviet jurists and social theorists (at least since 
the death of Stalin) who have sought to expand legally protected 
individual rights . These jurists can be referred to as proceduralists, 75 in 
that they generally emphasize "socialist legality" in the sense of "the 
prevention, where possible, of wholly arbitrary action." 76 Such 
proceduralists can be contrasted with what might be referred to as 
paternalists or parentalists who emphasize the use of judicial and 
quasi-judicial institutions as a process of authoritarian education and 
ultimately the substitution of communal sanctions for judicial process . 
The debate between these two schools of legal thought has been 
summarized as follows: 
In [the] post-1957 period two overlapping processes were at 
work; on the one hand, the institutional leeway in terms of 
codes, statistics, textbooks, and procedural clarification, was 
being made up; on the other, a new trend towards the 
substitution of communal sanctions for judicial process was 
being launched, with the evident approval of the party 
authorities. Tne landmarks of the first were the All-Union 
enactments of December 1958, which included new All-Union 
Basic Principles of Criminal Law and of Criminal Procedural 
Law; and after that the derivative Republican Codes of 
Criminal Law (brought out seriatim in the period May 1959-
1961) and of Criminal Procedural Law. The landmarks of the 
second were the institution in 1958 of the unpaid, voluntary 
guardians of public law and order or druzhinniki, as they later 
came to be known; the breathing of new life into the comrades' 
courts (which had existed on and off ever since 1919), and the 
regularisation in mid-1961 of their status, scope, and 
functions; and the widespread reintroduction of collective 
probation (peredacha na poruki) which had also fallen into 
disuse, as well as of other forms of public participation in the 
discharge of justice ('communal defenders' and 'communal 
prosecutors ,' commissions for the protection of socialist 
legality, street committees and councils of elders, etc.). 
These two trends, which might be called, respectively, the 
proceduralist and the paternalist, were not, of course, 
necessarily mutually exclusive nor, for the matter, mutually 
inimical. The effective resuscitation of communal probation 
dates from the December 1958 enactments. in addition to 
75. See Campbell, supra note 7, at 56-58. 
76. I. L APENNA, STATE AND LAW : SOVIET AND YUGOSLAV THEORY 51 (1964). 
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which it has also been the subject of numerous decrees of the 
U.S.S.R. Supreme Court. Nevertheless, they definitely tend to 
pursue divergent lines: to take but one specific point, the 
comrades' courts can deal with actionable offences without 
being bound by standard judicial procedure.77 
The proceduralist, in the Soviet Union, argues in terms of procedural 
rights and sanctions, and the rule of law doctrine; the paternalist, on 
the other hand, thinks in terms of public censure and communal 
ostracism, and the "democratizing of justice." The precise demarcation 
of where socialist law ends and where communal action takes over 
continues to arouse considerable controversy in the Soviet Union. 
The stateless aspect of communism, coupled with the continuing 
economic administration of society, requires that the "new Soviet man" 
be educated so as to observe the rules of communist life without overt 
state coercion. As a functional means for attaining this goal, certain 
judicial and quasi-judical institutions are to be utilized in the Soviet 
Union to educate deviating individuals, as well as the general populace, 
so that the new normative patterns of behavior will become habitual. It 
remains to be determined whether this approach, which is advocated by 
the Soviet "parentalists," carries any dysfunctional implications for the 
rule of law in the Soviet system during the remaining life of the coercive 
legal institutions. 
V. DYSFUNCTIONALITY 78 
We m 'lY safely assume, from the perspective of the Soviet 
"proceduralists" that the rule of law doctrine implies a large number of 
complex normative rules in order to relate importantly to the 
complexities of Soviet life prior to the realization of true communism. It 
would be pointless to assume that such rules could be reduced to a few 
absurdly simple ones. But if the rules are numerous and complex, so as 
to relate importantly to the complexities of socialist life, it is safe to 
assume that satisfactory mastery of them may be beyond the 
competence of a part-time effort by ordinary citizens of average 
intelligence. The adjudication process cannot operate under a rule of 
law unless there is some minim um mastery of the rules and their 
various possible applications in the numerous situations which most 
assuredly will arise. As these rules become more numerous and more 
complex, a judicial profession at some point becomes necessary for their 
just application. All members of the general public @bviously cannot be 
expected to specialize in this area. 
The Comrades' Courts are one legal institution that the Soviet social 
77. Campbell, :;upra note 7, at 57-58 (emphasis added). 
78. Portions of this section are based on D. Funk, supra note 48, at 84-89. 
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theorists rely on to carry out the educational task of developing the 
"new Soviet man." These courts have been specifically designed to 
provide a forum for the adjudication of minor disputes, where the 
adjudicators are members of the general public (preferably fellow-
workers and neighbors) of the person appearing before the court. While 
this does not necessarily prevent these social "courts" from being 
considered legal institutions even though they are not staffed by 
professional judges, this does mean that there may be a dysfunctional 
effect on the rule of law when mem hers of the general public are used as 
adjudicators instead of professional judges. Indeed, it can hardly be 
expected that members of the general public can have the same 
familiarity with the rules of law as a profession of specially selected, 
trained and experienced judges. The Comrades' Courts must necessarily 
decide cases on a somewhat ad hoc basis, which is the very essence of 
discretionary administration, and therefore is categorically opposed to 
the rule of law. Thus, the Comrades' Courts may be viewed as 
increasing the role of administration as opposed to the rule of law. 
This shift from legal to administrative processes is at least minimally 
consonant with the basic tenet of Marxist ideology that the state and its 
legal institutions will be replaced by informal socioeconomic 
administration. However, our concern here is to indicate that the shift 
from a system of formalized legal institutions to a system of 
discretionary administration which stresses a form of authoritarian 
education may manifest dysfunctional implications for the rule of law. 
This tendency appears also when Soviet jurists and social theorists 
advocate an increased utilization of the more traditional legal 
institutions in order to further the education of the "new Soviet man" in 
preparation for communism. Perhaps it is theoretically possible for a 
judge to play the role of a detached, independent adjudicator, bound by 
the laws on the one hand, and impartially rendering a decision within 
the scope permitted by those laws while, on the other hand, lecturing, 
teaching and attempting generally to influence the person before him 
(as well as the general public) in an authoritarian and parental manner. 
However, it seems much more likely that these two roles may be 
mutually exclusive under most circumstances. When the judge assumes 
the role of authoritarian parent, he may greatly detract from that 
impartial independence that is necessary for the rule of law. And, 
insofar as the judge succeeds as an authoritarian educator of the 
defendants before him, he may detract from the judicial administration 
according to the rule of law. 
The selection of a particular sentence to fit a specific defendant is not 
ordinarily part of the rule of law doctrine. However, in most Western 
legal systems maximum and minimum limits for sentences are 
ordinarily prescribed, and within these limits the judge may be free to 
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select the sentence most appropriate to the particular crime and the 
specific defendant. Although the selection of a particular sentence for a 
specific defendant is not part of the rule of law doctrine, the idea that 
this selection must be based on the criminal acts of the defendant is, 
indeed, an integral part of the rule of law. When the judge selects the 
appropriate sentence, not merely with the view to the immediate effect 
on and appropriateness for the defendant before him but also with 
concern as to the effect on others present in the courtroom, as well as 
the general public, another element of discretionary administration is 
introduced. Perhaps in theory the sentence that is appropriate for the 
specific defendant may also have the desired educational effect on the 
audience, but it seems much more likely that, insofar as the judge 
considers primary the educational effect on the spectators, he may 
depart from the rule of law and fail to decide the case on those factors 
over which the particular defendant had control. To this extent, the 
operation of the legal system according to the rule of law is likely to be 
diminished and the role of discretionary administration 
correspondingly increased. 
This result is even more obvious with respect to exemplary or 
demonstration trials by which the Soviet courts attempt to use a 
particular trial as an "object lesson" for others. Here again, in theory it 
may be possible for a "trial" to have the same outcome, whether it is 
intended as an example for others or not. But it seems much more likely 
that, in serving its avowed positive propagandistic function, this will 
not be so. Admittedly, the doctrine of stare decisis . in Western legal 
theory can be interpreted as viewing the trial procedure as having at 
least three general functions: (1) the disposition of the particular case 
under preexisting rules, (2) the extension of these rules to accomodate 
the special case, and (3) the instruction of others in a similar position on 
the theory that security and certainty require that accepted and 
established legal principles, under which rights may accrue, be 
recognized and followed. Clearly these functions are consistent with the 
rule of law. In contrast, the specific use of a particular trial to educate 
others in an authoritarian way implies not just the extension of rules, 
but rather an overriding emphasis on the educational use of the trial 
and the resulting decision. If the judge intends the outcome to be used in 
this way, then this intention will most certainly affect the outcome of 
the case itself. Stated another way, the outcome of a particular trial 
may not be based strictly on actions over which the defendant had 
control, since the judge is likely to be influenced by the educational 
effect which he intends his decision to have on others. This again 
increases the element of discretionary administration and 
correspondingly diminishes the rule of law. 
In summary, it can be argued that the use of Soviet legal institutions 
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for the authoritarian educational purpose of changing and perfecting 
man in preparation for communism generally tends to increase the role 
of discretionary administration and to diminish the rule of law. Such 
quasi-judicial arrangements as the Comrades' Courts and other 
specialized tribunals may invite the danger of informal action without 
procedural safeguards. It mav. therefore. be misleading to consider 
such development as ~n1 advance toward "popular participation." No 
attempt has been made herein to measure tne extent .of this effect, 
or to docume·nt by quantitative sociological studies the actual 
dysfunctionality caused to the Soviet sociolegal system. There is little 
evidence that the Soviets have attempted objectively and by means of 
"concrete sociological research" to determine comprehensively the 
efficacy of utilizing certain judicial and quasi-judicial institutions for 
authoritarian educational use. Clearly, if the social reconstruction of 
the "new Soviet man" is to be optimally guided for the attainment of the 
communist state of public self-government, then it would seem 
imperative for the Soviets to develop and explicate their own sociology 
of law based upon the methodology and ideological constructs of the 
Soviet social sciences. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
During the transitional period, prior to the complete "withering 
away" of the state and its coercive legal institutions, the role of socialist 
law and its attendant .sociolegal institutions is conceived in the Soviet 
Union as educating and directing the masses in behavior patterns 
appropriate for the future stage of true communism. The "new Soviet 
man" must be educated and trained to voluntarily observe the norms 
required for the continuing socialist administration of the economic 
means of production and for the forthcoming stage of public self-
government. As Professor Berman has stated, "the main purpose of 
official law is to shape, and develop that unofficial law-consciousness, 
so that people will actually think and feel what the state, through 
official law, prescribes." 79 
The trend in the Soviet Union to rely on the judicial system not 
merely for resolution of specific legal disputes but also to serve a more 
general function as an agent of socialization for the entire 
citizenry-educating the public to the major values of society and of the 
legal system-may be paralleled by a similar trend today in the United 
States, particularly in certain quasi-judicial . and administrative 
settings. Indeed, it is quite possible that this trend is a general feature 
of legal development in modern industrial societies. "And clearly the 
79. H. BERMAN, supra note 7, at 28~. 
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potential function of law as a socialization mechanism has important 
implications for the attempt consciously to use legal form and 
substance in the promotion of more general social change." 80 
The Soviets contemplate a social "habituation" process whereby the 
"new Soviet man" will become accustomed to maintaining and carrying 
out socialist laws, caring for socialist property, maintaining an 
honorable attitude towards the Soviet state, social duty and labor 
discipline, and respecting the rules of socialist life together. 81 There is 
no express avowal by the Soviet social theorists that this habituation 
process is necessarily interactive-it is not intended that the general 
populace who are acquiringthe "habits" of approved socialist behavior 
should also actively participate in the determination and delineation of 
exactly what social norms should be politically approved. Indeed this 
latter process is generally viewed unidirectionally within the Soviet 
system, in that the social directives of the Communist Party, as 
manifested through the operation of certain judicial and quasi-judicial 
institutions, is usually determinative of proper socialist behavior. It has 
been submitted that this indoctrinational use ·of certain legal 
institutions can be categorized under the general heading of 
authoritarian education and that this approach to the creation of the 
"new Soviet man" may have certain dysfunctional implications for the 
rule of law doctrine in the Soviet Union. 
From this perspective the quasi-judicial institutions such a~ the 
Comrades' Courts and the Peoples' Volunteer Militia might be viewed as 
merely subsidiary and advisory organs since they operate fully under 
the direction of the professional Party and state officials. However, 
overlooking certain obvious privileges, it must be remembered that the 
professional members of the Party are also members of the citizenry of 
the Soviet State (although a rather elite minority of that general 
citizenry). Nevertheless, the old guard must inevitably wither and die or 
be replaced. Furthermore, as discussed above, the unidirectional 
interpretation overlooks the inherent interaction found in any 
sociolegal system where conflicts of interest and dispute situations 
invariably arise. Indeed, the Soviet social theorists are quick to 
acknowledge that "living" and creative communism is the cause of the 
masses themselves. the result of the creativity of collective millions. 
In the area of "creative social development" it is necessary, state the 
Soviet social theorists, to disclose the existing societal possibilities and 
then strive for the realization of those options that most closely 
80. E. ~HUR, LAW AND SocIE'J.'Y: A SocIOLOGICAL VIEw 20-21 (1968). 
81. See Fundamental Principles of Legislation on the Judicial Structure of the 
U.S.S.R., and Union and Autonomous Republics, art. 3, " 1 (1958), transl,ated in H. 
BERMAN, supra note 7, at 305. 
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approximate the requirements for the steady and progressive 
development of the Soviet society. The general direction of this 
creativity is determined by the leadership of the Communist Party, 
which in turn must rely on modern scientific social theory. The Soviet 
social theo~ists believe that the Marxist-Leninist theory, in reflecting 
the general laws of social development, makes it possible to use those 
laws in practice to foresee the basic directions of historical 
development, and to determine the most appropriate ways and means 
of building communism. However, in practice this societal construction 
is always a many faceted and contradictory process that must be under 
the Party's constant observation so that one may know precisely where 
and when there appear various difficulties and new contradictions, 
whether distortions and weak links are arising, and where, on the other 
hand, progressive "growth points" arise. The Soviet social sciences have 
the collective obligation of showing the causes of these phenomena, of 
studying the favorable as well as the negative factors, and of helping to 
disclose the realization of the activity of the masses which includes 
those creative potentialities that are inherent in the socialist system. 
Legal institutions-such as the courts, certain sociolegal 
organizations, laws, and implied sanctions-may serve many functioP ~ 
within a complex social system. This article has suggested a sociologica.. 
typology which tentatively divides these functions into nine categories, 
which can be used to analyze modern legal systems and to clarify 
certain interactional aspects of such dynamic ongoing systems. 
Although the self-actualizing function of law has been discusse'1. in this 
brief outline as characteristic of the role of law in the Soviet system, it 
is submitted that this same function exists with varying degrees of 
emphasis in all other modern legal systems. 
Obviously, this article has only brushed the surface of a vast area of 
sociological jurisprudence where much research and comparative 
analysis is needed. Thurman Arnold once described the judicial trial in 
Western society as a "series of object lessons and examples .... It is the 
way in which society is trained in right ways of thought and action, not 
by compulsion, but by parables which it interprets and follows 
voluntarily." 82 The extent to which this statement is valid needs to be 
empirically tested. Future sociolegal research in this general area 
should include a comprehensive comparative analysis of the 
effectiveness of the educational and heuristic use of legal institutions in 
other social systems, and an analysis of the extent to which emphasis 
placed on the various functions of law within a legal system represent a 
particular concept of man and of the perfectibility of human nature. To 
paraphrase Rousseau: Whoso would undertake to give legal institutions 
82. T . ARNOLD, THE SYMBOi.S OF GOVERNMENT 129 (1935). 
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to a People must work with full consciousness that he has set himself to 
change, as it were, the very stuff of human nature.83 
..o---------~ Behavior :1 
~/~ 
Law12~ /~av~ 
Law 'n Behaviorn 
83. See Rousseau, supra note 1, at 205. 
38
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 1, No. 1 [1972], Art. 2
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol1/iss1/2
